MARRIAGE PROMISES AND THE VALUE OF A WOMAN'S TESTIMONY IN COLONIAL MEXICO PATRICIA SEED
In the early seventeenth century, the declarations of middle-and u class women in colonial Mexico regarding their promises to mar greatly respected, and women appeared as a matter of course in church courts as witnesses to marriage applications and engagem century and a half later women's declarations regarding such p were considered skeptically, and few women testified as witnes then only if permission from their husbands was obtained and Women's testimony was increasingly deemed unreliable by churc judges and admitted only if it corroborated that of male witnesses o authorized by men. Why should attitudes toward the reliability and of female voices have altered so radically over this period?
Modern feminist scholarship has until now focused princip socioeconomic changes in the status of women during the early era. The value and respect accorded women, however, was also influe by changes in cultural evaluations of prestige. Anthropologists Research for this article was supported by the Social Science Research Counc Fulbright-Hays dissertation fellowship. The writing was facilitated by the Nation ment for the Humanities Seminar on the Early Printed Book as well as by helpful c from Thomas Haskell, Molly Kelly, Asunci6n Laurin, George Marcus, and Steph is drawn from the records of the principal institution mediating conflicts about honor, the Catholic church. Because marriage provided the best remedy for a woman's loss of honor, ordinary marriage license applications often referred to the mode of concluding an engagement or the initiation of sexual activity, particularly if a couple wished to have the church marry them secretly. The approximately 16,000 such applications made in the archdiocesan court of Mexico between 1574 and 1779 are thus a rich source of information about prevailing standards of honor. In addition, disputes over honor, typically arising from parental opposition to an intended marriage or breach-of-promise case, gave rise to a smaller number of complaints and formal lawsuits filed in the archdiocesan court. 5 The code of honor was an imported Spanish cultural ideal that differed markedly from the criteria for prestige found among Indians and blacks. As many Spanish priests noted with exasperation, Indians did not share the Spanish reverence for virginity; nor did the Africans, although clerical complaints on the subject were noticeably rare.6 Not surprisingly, concern with the code of honor was greatest among ethnic Spaniards and racially mixed persons, that is, those most likely to have assimilated or inherited Spanish ideas about social respectability. The term "Spaniards" as used in these records referred both to whites, regardless of social position, and to those of high social standing, even if racially mixed. License applications and court records of these two groups constitute the bulk of the data from which this study is drawn.
Women's word upheld by the code of honor, 1574-1689
As defined by medieval theologian Peter Lombard, the essence of marriage in the Roman Catholic tradition is the consent of the parties, and an oral 5 Throughout the colonial period, marriage applications (later known as informaciones matrimoniales) from couples residing in different parishes, or difficult or potentially troublesome applications from throughout the diocese, remained in the hands of the archdiocesan court of the provisor and vicar general. Ordinary applications for the Spanish and racially mixed parishes of Mexico City were also initially kept by the archdiocesan court until the numbers became unwieldy. This function was transferred gradually to the parishes during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This archive of this archdiocesan court is located in the Archivo General de la Naci6n, Mexico City, and is found primarily in the ramos Matrimonios and Archivo del Provisorato. Occasional cases are also located in Clero Regular y Secular, Civil, Juzgado de Capellanias, Bienes Nacionales, among others, all in the Archivo General. 6 Juan Baptista, Advertencia para los confesores de los naturales (Mexico: M. Ocharte, 1600), fol. 16v; Alonso Pefia Montenegro, Itinerario para parrocos de Indias (Madrid:
Fernandez de Buendia, 1668), lib. 3, trat. 4, no. 4 . Because slaves had no honor in Spanish society, Spaniards had no concern for their honor. Slaveowners were interested in the reproductive capacity of their female slaves; any effort to preserve virginity was antithetical to such interests.
declaration best indicates the true interior state and intention of the couple. Spoken words are thus seen as the expression of an interior state of being and constitute the heart of the marriage ceremony.7
In church law, engagement was created by "words of the future" [palabras de futuro], the promise to marry in the future. The essence of marriage and engagement as verbal commitments is linked to the fundamentally oral culture of medieval Europe in which these definitions originated.8
Despite the advent of the printing press around 1450, the spoken word remained important during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.9
Speaking and doing were synonymous, and words were widely regarded as Church authorities required only that marriage promises be spoken in the future tense. Local custom was far more stringent, prescribing engagement ceremonies, that is, the public or private witnessing of the engagement, and even specifying the language of the promise itself. Such customs varied widely across Catholic Europe. Wealthy families in fifteenthcentury Florence held elaborate ceremonies in the presence of a notary; sixteenth-century English peasants often held public festivities that rivaled the wedding.1 Colonial Mexican couples, however, preferred private exchanges in their own homes with family or friends as witnesses. When Juan de Monguiar became engaged to Juana Moreno in 1629 he called upon his friends to witness his declaration; Alonso Delgado and Ana Maria Vargas were surrounded by friends in the main room of Ana Maria's house as they promised to marry, embraced, and exchanged gifts. Antonia Castani6n, accompanied by a servant, met her fiance in the doorway of her home while friends and relatives faced them from the street. The two pledged to marry, and Antonia gave Juan an elaborate ring. In 1629, Diego Sanchez de Peralta and Augustina de Alva met together with a group of their friends in a house in the countryside outside the town of Chalco in order to avoid the inquisitive eye of Augustina's grandmother. The two joined hands as they solemnly promised to be husband and wife, then embraced and exchanged presents.12
In order to persuade priests and church officials of the legitimacy of engagements, young Mexican couples brought their witnesses to describe the exchange of promises. Twelve percent of these witnesses were female.'3 Because the essence of the promise to marry was the spoken word, witnesses to the verbal pact were essential to prove to church officials the existence of a promise to marry.
Witnesses also sometimes noted two symbolic elements at the engagements, an embrace and a gift. The physical touching-a kiss or, frequently, a joining of hands-merely symbolized the future physical union of the couple. The exchange of gifts, like the physical gestures, did not validate the engagement in church law; nonetheless, it had a great cultural importance.
In the seventeenth century, couples and their witnesses sometimes called engagement gifts "signs" of the intention to marry. Signs and the use of the word "signs" are associated with a predominantly oral mode of communication. A sign is a visualized word, and designating engagement presents as "signs" reinforced the oral nature of the commitment to marry. 14 During the medieval period, the difference between a promise of future marriage ("words of the future") and the declaration of present intent ("words of the present") had been ambiguous. Several important medieval canonists held that, if a pact of future marriage was followed by sex, the couple was legally married. Only in the fourteenth century was this doctrine rejected and Peter Lombard's formulation accepted by the church as the sole valid form of Catholic marriage.15
Since only the spoken word was necessary to establish the legality of a marriage, the period of engagement remained critical for a woman's sexual virtue. The idea that marriage began with a promise to marry followed by intercourse persisted as a popular idea, however,16 and couples who promised to marry often began to have sexual relations and expected to marry not long thereafter.17 If parents attempted to halt the union or one of the 14 AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 88, fol. 339v; vol. 48, no. 122 (1628) ; Archivo del Provisorato, caja 15, Castafion-Crespo; Matrimonios, vol. 10, no. 27 (1629) . Other cases are in AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 13, no. 7; vol. 71, no. 9 (1612) Matrimonios, vol. 86, fols. 319-72v (1770); vol. 121, no. 96 (1729); vol. 33, no. 40 (1764); vol. 73, no. 43 (1773). parties experienced a change of heart, however, the honor of the young woman became a prominent issue because virginity had often already been lost. Couples faced with parental opposition often appealed to the Catholic church, which insisted on the right of couples to marry despite familial wishes to the contrary. Between 1574 and 1689, church officials consistently permitted young men to marry women with whom they had had sexual relations under promise of marriage despite opposition from their parents and guardians.18
Couples in such circumstances worked to convince church officials of the importance of marrying to protect the honor of the young woman.
Nicolas Cardenas and Juana Rodriguez made plans to marry, but her family opposed the match. When Juana became pregnant, the couple appealed to ecclesiastical officials for help and were allowed to marry secretly to forestall interference from her family. In 1629, T6mas Menses came before the ecclesiastical magistrate with a similar problem. He had promised to marry Antonia Gutierrez, who had become pregnant. To protect both of them from the "great scandal and troubles" that her brothers, who believed she was a virgin, would inflict if they knew of her unmarried pregnancy, he asked for and was granted a secret marriage."9
On other occasions men refused to honor their promises or tried to postpone marriage indefinitely. If there were no witnesses to the exchange of promises, the man might claim he had never promised to marry; if such witnesses did exist, he might argue that the woman had not been a virgin.
But such subterfuges were rare in early seventeenth-century Mexico.
Since the social consequences of losing one's virginity prior to engagement were, for women, so dire (exposed to scorn, humiliation, and degradation by her kin),20 family, friends, and ecclesiastical officials assumed that no woman would engage in sexual activity with a man without a promise to marry.
Whether sexual intercourse had taken place was not at issue so much as whether a promise had been made. In some cases young women even appear to have informed family members of the location of their trysts in order to be caught. Just after sunset on a Sunday evening in 1621, the 18 Remedying lost honor was a factor in half of the conflicts over marriage choice in the archdiocesan court of Mexico from 1589 to 1689. Patricia Seed, To Love, Honor and Obey in Colonial Mexico (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, in press), chap. 4.
"9 For example, AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 10, no. 140; vol. 10, no. 210 (1629) ; Archivo del Provisorato, caja 23, P6rez Vargas-Morales (1698).
20 Sanctions against a woman who engaged in sex with a man who failed to fulfill his promise to marry would have been private since her honor and that of her family were intertwined. To embarrass a woman publicly-by throwing her out, for example-would have disgraced her family even more, so the family, if possible, claimed publicly that a sexual relationship had never occurred. Yet within the family itself, such a woman would have been subject to verbal and often physical abuse, sometimes resulting in death. If lucky, she would become a virtual nonperson or at best relegated to the lowest level of the family hierarchy.
father of Ines de la Isla found her with Diego Torres. Her father demanded that Diego marry his daughter immediately, and the next morning he appeared in church court to begin the steps toward marriage.21 The question of whether Ines had been a virgin when the couple began relations was not raised, nor did Diego deny that he promised to marry her. Men's acquiescence in such circumstances was based on their fear of the woman's male relatives as well as on cultural norms that demanded male valor and fidelity to their promises. The presumption was that honorable men would not engage in intercourse without promising to marry. Unhesitating acceptance by religious and royal judges and the supportive attitude of families toward women who admitted loss of sexual honor under promise of marriage illustrate the respect in which society held a woman's solemn declaration regarding such a promise-respect engendered by the social consensus concerning honor's importance. Men had to be held to their promises, since oaths were the basis of trust among their fellows. Women took a grave risk in exposing their loss of honor. Their courage in so doing gave their assertions weight; their vulnerability gave them moral integrity and entitled them to assistance.
It was, therefore, not only her family that respected her word in this matter but also the institutions of Spanish society in colonial Mexico. The great number of cases in which a woman claimed a suitor was slow in acting on his promise to marry were settled quickly by forcing the suitor to act with honor or suffer the consequences. Only in one case resolved by the church did a suitor deny the existence of a promise, only, under great pressure, to reverse himself days later.22 The fact that church officials leaned heavily on the male partner in these disputes and made appeals to male standards of honor in order to resolve them enhanced the power and standing of women's testimony.
Both royal and church officials had jurisdiction in such cases: clergymen could remedy the transgression through marriage, while secular author ities could impose criminal penalties. Royal officials and local police responded to allegations of sexual misconduct by arresting and imprisoning men for having had sex with, and thus dishonoring, young women. Offenders were given the opportunity either to marry or be sent to the Philippines to work on His Majesty's fortresses, a severe punishment for breaching the code of honor.23
Fidelity to marriage promises was thus regarded as a grave responsibility on the part of men throughout the Spanish-speaking world. In the 21 AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 85, no. 16 (1621) ; see also Archivo del Provisorato, caja 1, Fernandez-Silva (1701); Documento en proceso, Bilbao-Jesus (1708). 22 AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 48, nos. 36, 39 (1628); vol. 65, no. 75 (1669); vol. 2 (1674) ; vol.
125, no. 2 (1683).
23 For example, AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 90, no. 162; vol. 102, fols. 255-57; vol. 102, fols. 255-57; vol. 86, no. 71 (1620); vol. 88, fols. 27-28v (1629) .
seventeenth-century code of sexual conduct regarding matters of courtship and chastity there was a marked emphasis on holding men accountable to honorable behavior. A man who seduced a young woman of similar social standing under promise of marriage could not expect to escape without either carrying out his promise or facing punishment. Assisted by ecclesiastical pressure to marry or by the threat of imprisonment from royal authorities or of direct personal harm from her family, young women could force men to fulfill their obligations. Men might dream of flouting conventions, but in fact their behavior, like women's, was circumscribed-a condition perhaps best illustrated by the story that has become the archetypal Spanish myth, the seventeenth-century legend of Don Juan.
Infamous defrauder of women's honor, Don Juan promised to marry humble women in order to seduce them and deceived noble women by impersonating their betrotheds. His tale thus embodies not universal dreams-as several Spanish literary critics would have it24-but the fantasies of men, specifically the fantasy of being able to escape the requirements of the code of honor. Because the culture of the era demanded that Don Juan be punished for his seductions, in the end, God, through the mediation of the father of one of the women he had seduced, takes revenge by casting him into hell for all eternity. Such an ending satisfied the moral sensibilities of the men who were forced to accept the responsibilities attendant to the code of honor. The story encompasses both the fantasy and a warning not to act on that fantasy.
The rise of written promises
Beginning in the 1660s, engagement customs and attitudes toward marriage promises began to change in ways that would eventually undermine the cultural consensus about honor. First, witnesses to the verbal promise to marry became increasingly rare in marriage license application proceedings; by 1670 only hearsay evidence appeared. Witnesses reported that they knew of the engagement but had not actually attended the exchange of promises. The comment "I understand that they have given each other a promise to marry" became increasingly common in court.25
At the same time, promises began to be written down. A written statement of intent instead of an oral vow signified that the commitment would be honored. The language of the promise itself sometimes noted th value of the written word: "I, T6mas Jose de la Fuente Salazar y Osso Spaniard, born and resident in this city of Mexico, and journeyman barb state that I give my promise of marriage to Juana Josefa Landeros, maid and free mulatta [parda] so that with this paper she may compel me marry her at any time. Therefore I give her this paper in my hand and [m signature for her greater security. In the city of Mexico on the fourth day the month of March of 1718."26
In the first decades of the eighteenth century, such written promises marry began to appear with increasing frequency. They ranged fr simple, straightforward declarations to unemotional, sometimes legalistic statements to moving professions of love. In the first category came the following simple but sincere statement signed by Juana Josefa de Artiag Although couples who could read and write had in the seventeent century occasionally exchanged handwritten promises, during the ei teenth century, the custom was more widespread and was adopted by th illiterate as well.29 Local scribes (evangelistas) who practiced their trade 26 AGN, Archivo del Provisorato, caja 20 (1718-19) . 27 AGN, Archivo del Provisorato, caja 20, Nufiez-Artiaga (1705); caja 14, Villanu Artiaga (1773) .
28 AGN, Archivo del Provisorato, caja 46 (1728). 29 In 1803 Spanish law mandated written promises to marry, declaring that hencefo only written statements would be valid. Civil law thus codified what had started as custom nearly a century before. This change, however, affected civil rather than relig public plazas and street corners wrote the promises down for their unlettered clients.30 Rather than presenting church officials with a few family and friends who had witnessed their declaration, couples presented the church with a written promise, a silent commitment to marry that proved their engagement.31 The sound of voices reflecting and indeed guaranteeing the interior will of the person disappeared into the silence of a pen.
At the same time, couples increasingly presented church officials with their engagement presents as proof of their commitment. The growing frequency of this practice was linked to a shift in the meaning of engagement gifts. Once referred to as a "sign," a mere indication of the verbal promise, the gift came to serve instead as a commitment embodied, a material manifestation of the promise itself32 that became more important than speaking the promise-in the same way that the written (concrete)
word became more important than the verbal word. Separating the promise to marry from the spoken word and investing it in an inert physical object-a gift-reflected the growing significance of the physical and material world as Hispanic society in the New World moved into the transition to the modern era.
Eventually the gifts signifying engagement became highly differenti- 32 Both the words "signs" (sefias) and "pledges" (prendas) were used prior to the eighteenth century to describe engagement presents, but beginning in the early eighteenth century "pledges" was used exclusively.
33 See, e.g., AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 36, no. 71 ; Archivo del Provisorato, caja 34, Hernandez-Torres (1670); caja 29, Diaz-Serrano (1768); Archivo del Provisorato, caja 1, Villasefior Montano (1770); caja 44, Ramirez-Sanchez (1778). Occasional nonreligious gifts included candlesticks, necklaces, and a heart-shaped dagger. See AGN, Matrimonios, Indiferente Vaidez-Quiroz (1764); Archivo del Provisorato, caja 29, Diaz-Serrano (1768); Matrimonios, vol. 30, no. 50 (1762) . Matrimonios, vol. 36, nos. 7, 8 (1736) -a woman was able to prove the absence of an engagement because she received only cloth as a gift from the man. gious items, signifying the sacred (engagement) rather than the profane (courtship) were customary. The most common present was a silver reliquary decorated with saints' images. Other engagement presents included medals, or rosaries of coral, sometimes embellished with elaborate Jerusalem crosses and, among the wealthy, jewels at intervals along the beads.
Rings made of gold and jewels or, among the less prosperous, of a copperzinc alloy that resembled gold were popular as well.34 Thus the exchange of a category of objects marking specifically engagement eventually lent the same kind of certainty to the declaration of intent to marry as did the written promise.
The shift from oral to written promises and the growing importance of objects as evidence of engagement also reflect a growing skepticism about the sincerity of spoken marriage promises. Beginning around 1670, young men began to treat marriage promises in a cavalier manner, appearing in church courts to deny the promise and to invent "vain pretexts" and excuses for their behavior.35 Initially these pleas had no impact on the procedures or language of church courts; officials hearing such cases simply dealt with such behavior on a case-by-case basis.
In 1671, the son of a well-to-do Mexico City family promised to marry Dofia Teresa Trejo, the daughter of a town councilman. After a year had passed, Teresa's mother asked the fiance, Jose, to fulfill his promise to marry. Appearing before the church court judge, the young man insisted that he had set a year's limit on the promise to marry, and it had expired.
(Hispanic tradition historically had allowed the termination of engagements if a formal time limit had been set for their expiration.) However, because the church court judge rejected this excuse as little more than a pretext, the young man tried another tactic, suggesting this time that the supposedly expired engagement be extended for another three years. Concepci6n (1684). The phrase "vain pretexts" was that of an ecclesiastical judge, AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 85, fol. 124-v. Later examples include vol. 15, no. 8 (1765); vol. 53, no. 4 (1710); Archivo del Provisorato, caja3, Sanchez-Montealbo (1726); Matrimonios, vol. 35, no. 2 (1738) .
Remarking that Jose's statements were malicious and prejudicial to a young woman of considerable social standing, the judge ordered Jose's arrest.36
Rather than admitting that his parents were pressuring him to retract his promise, the boy devised a series of subterfuges, a course virtually unheard of in earlier years. Jose's case marked the start of what would become endemic cynicism about the obligations that spoken marriage promises entailed.37
This cynicism eventually manifested itself in a number of strategies. Occasionally men admitted that they had only promised to marry in order to obtain sexual favors and had no intention of carrying out the promise. A more frequent tactic was to attack the woman's honor by denying that she had been a virgin when the relationship began, for the code of honor required the remedy of marriage only if a man deprived a woman of her virginity. This strategy appears first in records of the 1670s and appears often in the records of subsequent years. One young man charged that after their engagement his girlfriend had become involved with another man, but all that could be proved was that the fiance was extremely jealous.
Another young man testified that he could not say whether the woman was a virgin or not because she was the first with whom he had ever had sex. On other occasions, friends of the man colluded to testify falsely that they knew the woman to have had sex with another man. If there was no evidence against the woman's assertion of her virginity and no possibility of fabricating such evidence, a general attack on the woman's character was common.
One family charged that the woman was "neither ... honest nor retiring, but is barefoot, scandalous and walks on the streets night and day."38 Because the presumption continued to be that an unmarried woman was a virgin unless proved to the contrary, either an attack on the deficiencies of the promise in canon law or a claim for competing obligations was a possible strategy in church courts. 3 AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 19, no. 2 (1671) . 37 The complex origin of male cynicism lies beyond the scope of this paper but can be mentioned briefly. Faced with intransigent parental opposition, many seventeenth-century couples deliberately entered into sexual relations in order to coerce their reluctant elders into consenting to a marriage. Their deliberate manipulation of the requirement for women's honor (premarital chastity) fostered an increased skepticism about the use of marriage promises and prenuptial sex as means of pressuring others into agreeing to a marriage. Other factors may have included an increased awareness of the discrepancy between public norms and private behavior. Some men, like the one who promised to marry the councilman's daughter, attempted to use the elaborate church regulations for breaking an engagement, cloaking their desire to terminate the relationship in the apparently neutral language of canon law. In 1702, Maria Gertrudis Carmona demanded that Jose Trujillo honor his promise to marry her. Jose appeared before the church court of Mexico City and alleged that Maria was engaged to marry someone else and that, therefore, under church law he was not obliged to marry her. Some young men invoked vague promises to enter the religious life; others cited obligations to widowed mothers or orphaned sisters. Others declared that a threatened loss of income or parental opposition was sufficient to break an engagement. In 1706, Don Jose Luis Rios became engaged to Dofia Ana Josefa Orozco y Godines.
When his mother threatened to withdraw his allowance and disinherit him, Jose Luis lost his willingness to marry. Ana Josefa, who had had sex with him, was furious and filed suit to force him to marry. He declared that he could not marry since he had good reason-his mother's threats-for changing his mind. When the ecclesiastical judge asked him to examine his conscience, since he had a duty to marry Ana Josefa, Jose Luis glibly replied he was under no such obligation. And Ana Josefa lost her honorable status.39 The paramount sense of obligation attached to men's promises clearly had declined.
While more secure than a spoken promise, even a written promise to marry was no guarantee that the commitment would be honored. In 1710,
Jose de Barrios, a young mulatto shoemaker, gave Maria de C6rdoba a written promise to marry. Shortly thereafter they had sex, planning to marry promptly. His parents, however, were dead set against the match because they would lose his income. Immediately after his brief interlude with Maria, his parents locked him up for several months, pressuring him to desist, and were eventually successful in convincing him to disregard his debt of honor.40 Men's resistance to the enforcement of the code of honor grew steadily in the first years of the eighteenth century. Conflicts over promises to marry, over "spousals" as church officials succinctly designated them, became the largest category of litigation heard by the chief magistrate of 39 AGN, Archivo del Provisorato, caja 1, Trujillo-Carmona (1702); Matrimonios, vol. 25, no. 72 (1752); vol. 86, fols. 349-72v (1770); vol. 25, Tapia-Ortiz; vol. 47, no. 72 (1777); vol. 30, no. 40 (1762); vol. 22, no. 1 (1756-57) ; Archivo del Provisorato, caja 40, Rios-Orozco Godines (1706). 40 AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 53, no. 16 (1710) . An excellent account of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century elopement customs is Verena Martinez-Alier, "Elopement and Seduction in Nineteenth-Century Cuba," Past and Present 55 (1972) : 91-129. Other examples include Matrimonios, vol. 53, no. 4 (1710); vol. 33, no. 40 (1764); vol. 86, fols. 319-72v (1770) , in which a man swears that he will sign in his own blood and then later attempts to deny the statement. the archdiocese of Mexico.41 The increase brings to light not merely increased rebelliousness among young men but the ineffectiveness of families' pressure (outside of court) on a man who failed to fulfill his promise to marry their sister or daughter.
Eventually men's refusal to abide by the code of honor in regard to marriage promises had an impact on the courts as well. Royal officials responded to the changing attitudes by lessening the punishment from exile to three years in jail. Whereas previously men were jailed indefinitely until they were sentenced or decided to marry, now they were sometimes released on bail.42 Predictably, reducing the criminal penalties hastened the devaluation of marital promises.
As the royal authorities mandated lighter penalties, the burden of upholding the code of honor fell increasingly to the Catholic church. Lacking any effective police power to sentence a person to exile or jail, church officials turned to a traditional ecclesiastical alternative: the man could either carry out his original promise to marry or compensate the woman financially. Called a dowry, the money was seen by church officials as both punishment for the man and compensation for the harm done the woman. 43 Not all women believed that financial compensation could remedy their honor; at first some refused financial payment.44 A woman who insisted that nothing short of marriage could sustain her honor when the man steadfastly refused to carry through on his promise, however, was not likely to be married. The woman lost her honor and gained neither financial nor marital status. In sharp contrast to the previous century, church courts after 1700 were more successful in exacting fines from men for failing to 41 Only a partial index to the records of this court (the first half of the ramo Matrimonios is available on card fiche in the National Archives, but it shows such cases amounted to 27.6 percent of the court's docket [excluding marriage license applications]). 42 AGN, Archivo del Provisorato, caja 1 (1727); Matrimonios, vol. 11, no. 49 (1770); vol. 73, no. 43 (1773) , remarks by Jose Antonio Serralde; vol. 13, no. 21 (1773) ; Civil 1496, PelaezEspindola (1778-79) contrast with AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 86, no. 71 (1620) . The location of exile shifted in the eighteenth century predominantly to Havana and Louisiana (Real Ordenanza, November 18, 1787 , Civil 1915 Civil 2234, exp. 9, fol. 2-v) .
43 Ecclesiastical thinking on this subject was clarified in debates at the Council of Trent (Esmein [n. 15 above], 2:279-82). For the controversy within the Mexican church over the merits of marriage to escape jailing by the royal police, see Perez (n. 17 above), 154-57. For examples, AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 11, no. 49, vol. 13, no. 21. 44 When Maria Rodriguez demanded that Lucas Ortega fulfill his promise to her, he denied having ever made such a promise. His offer of 20 pesos to compensate her for damages was rejected on grounds that her honor could not be remedied by anything short of marriage.
A threat to institute criminal charges resulted only in raising the promised sum to 30 pesos. This offer was again refused, on grounds that nothing short of marriage could remedy honor. fulfill marriage promises than in preserving women's honor by forcing the men into marriage. ' In 1710, a young man who worked in the Royal Mint attempted to dodge his responsibilities by stating that, although he had sex with a young woman, he had not promised to marry her. In the eyes of church officials, it was highly unlikely that a respectable Spanish girl would have risked her honor without promise of marriage, so the courts asked the man to compensate her by paying her the substantial sum of 100 pesos.46 The amount of compensation varied with the individual's ability to pay, from 6 or 7 pesos for a poor man or Indian, to 30 pesos assessed against an artisan of modest means, and to 700 pesos required of a wealthy merchant who had dishonored the goddaughter of a Marquis.47 In subsequent years this remedy became increasingly common and by mid-century appears to have been accepted by men and, often with resignation, by women. The possibility of a financial remedy, however, signaled not only a different set of consequences for men who failed to honor their promises but the possibility that the consequences could be shared. When taking a woman's honor would likely mean imprisonment or exile, honor was an intensely personal responsibility that could not be shared with anyone else. When the punishment was, instead, a financial hardship, one's obligation to the code of honor could be redeemed by or shared with another (who could earn the money or make it available). Less severe consequences for refusing to fulfill a marriage promise 45 AGN, Archivo del Provisorato, caja 10, Origuela-Solis (1765); caja 1, Cepeda-Ruiz (1764); caja 14, Joaquin-Becerra (1761). For a rare instance of marriage, see AGN, Mat 25, Tapia-Ortiz; more usual are the fines described in n. 47 below.
46 AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 53, no. 4 (1710) .
reinforced the waning importance of such promises. The result, of course, was that promises to marry, already less secure than in previous times, became increasingly unenforceable and increasingly meaningless. The consequences for young women were often unfortunate and sometimes tragic.
In 1772, in the small hillside community of Tacubaya outside of Mexico City, Felipe Farno, the collector for a religious confraternity, promised to marry Maria Gertrudis Aduna. They had a sexual relationship for two years without marrying. When Maria Gertrudis, by then pregnant, asked the church court to have him marry her or at least support their child, he was arrested in order to be brought to court. Released on bail, he disappeared, never to be heard from again. It was impossible to get him to appear in church court, much less pay for the support of the child he fathered. Isabel Rodriguez lost her virginity to a carpenter named Bentura Flores. She became pregnant and tried to enforce Bentura's promise to marry. Bentura tried to escape his obligations first by alleging that, even though he had fathered the child, he had not promised to marry her. He argued that he had parents and four sisters to care for, complained of poverty, and, finally, reluctantly offered to pay Isabel 40 pesos. Isabel, however, never lived to hear his offer; she died giving birth to his child. Her mother, furious at the way Bentura had treated her daughter and angry over her death, sued Bentura. There is no record that she was ever compensated.48
Neither disappearance while on bail nor lengthy delays in compensation would have been tolerated in the seventeenth century. At that time young men were not usually released for such a serious offense but were held in prison indefinitely until they either married the woman or were sent to permanent exile. In the eighteenth century, release on bail was customary, as was flight to avoid prosecution following release.49 Moreover, the seventeenth-century church often forestalled delay by ordering men to fulfill their obligations in less than a week or face lengthy imprisonment, but after 1730 church officials increasingly overlooked such delays, which often resulted in the woman's abandoning her efforts to obtain either marriage or financial compensation.50
The consequences of these changes for women were considerable.
Honor, once lost, could not be restored. The public disclosure of lost honor in such a case meant the end of any future status aspirations; honorable marriage was out of the question. Since financial judgments, even when ordered by church officials, became increasingly difficult to collect, women were often reduced to penury or to dependence on charity from other members of their families-uncles, brothers, or anyone who would occasionally contribute to their upkeep and that of their children.
The devaluation of marriage promises I have described is rooted not only in weakening social sanctions regarding the obligation to marriage promises but, more profoundly, in the shift from oral to written expression of those promises. In societies primarily dependent upon oral communication, speech is conflated with action and is thus a direct and unmediated manifestation of a person's reputation. Stories passed down in oral tradition, themselves accounts of others' deeds and words, merely reinforce the seamless links between a person's reputation, actions, and speech. In contrast, in societies in which written and, later, printed texts have gained prestige and wide distribution, the habit of abstraction-the separation of persons from their deeds and words-is strongly developed. Such societies, including all European societies, are thus able to explain events in terms of abstract forces. Through the act of writing, which anticipates a silent reading, statements, declarations, and affirmations become separable from the speaker. In eighteenth-century Mexico, as in Europe during the century before, the written word replaced the oral as the one that mattered and that agents of authority would enforce.51
When a man's promise to marry a woman could be written down or embodied in objects such as engagement presents, it became separable from the person. In eighteenth-century Mexico, this separation signified more than a simple transition from oral to written expression, it foreshadowed an alienation52 of men from their personal integrity, their honor, with the result that they no longer felt an intensely personal obligation to fulfill promises that were merely spoken. Whatever a man's personal reputation, he could be held only to what he wrote or agreed to in writing. The growing use of literate forms gradually reduced the importance of personal virtue.53
Thus honor-in the sense of personal virtue-declined in part because it was linked to an oral tradition whose central role in the culture was gradually eroding.
A growing body of scholarship on the transition from largely oral to 51 Ong, Presence (n. 8 above), [195] [196] [197] [198] [199] [200] [201] [202] [203] [204] [205] [206] [207] Yates (n. 8 The other scenario attributes the growing prestige and authority of writing to the technical advances writing facilitated in increasingly bureaucratized institutions of authority. The use of written communication among church and secular officials in their own organizations and the increasing reliance upon written information to make judicial decisions outpaced oral modes. Writing ensured certainty in the governance of religious and secular institutions and in legal and judicial procedures of all kinds.57 As the general population became more involved with institutions that relied upon written communication, the identification of oral assertion with honorable conduct disintegrated. In the proceedings of church courts in colonial Mexico, the spoken vow gave way to written contracts and pledges. Both the parties involved and the community witnessing the case viewed spoken vows with increasing cynicism.
The decreasing severity of consequences for men's failure to honor their promises, and in particular the increasing prominence of fines as punishment for violating a woman's honor, contributed still further to the separation of a man from his promise, by enabling other men to share the obligations of promises. Since promise-keeping lay at the heart of the traditional definition of honor, this transformation of male honor, together with the growing prestige of literacy, had significant consequences for women and for relations between the sexes.
Women were at a substantial disadvantage relative to men in the declining importance of oral communication, since they were less often able to read or write. A rudimentary indicator of literacy, the ability to sign one's name to the marriage license applications, shows a dramatic discrepancy between men and women. In a sample of these applications over a two-hundred-year period (1574-1779), the percentage of women who could manage to put even a few letters together was 16 percent; the figure for men was more than 46 percent.5 The criterion of certainty which had once applied equally to men and women-oral testimony-was transformed when men's testimony gained greater credibility because of their greater access to the more prestigious form of verification-writing.
Just as men's promises to marry were devalued, so women's assertions that they had consented to intercourse only under promise of marriage lost credibility. The decline in the power of spoken words applied to both men's promises and women's claims that there had been a promise.
Women were doubly harmed, however, because they were still held to the code of honor which required premarital chastity even though their statements regarding their loss of sexual status were no longer believed. Without written corroboration, a woman's sworn assertions now carried little weight with church officials. Now a written promise, a gift, or widespread public knowledge of the engagement was necessary to corroborate a woman's word.59
At the same time as a woman's testimony about the existence of her own partner's promise to marry became devalued, so did her testimony as witness to men's promises to marry. By the mid-eighteenth century women had virtually disappeared from even their small role as witnesses in marriage license applications.6 Commenting in 1715 on a family conflict over marriage, the legal adviser to the ecclesiastical court of Mexico City observed, "The first two witnesses are under 25 and the last two [are] women, who by general rule are excluded from testifying." He finally decided to admit their affirmation only because it corroborated that offered by the men, thus "purging them of the stain of sex which is founded on their
[female] imbecility."61 On other occasions, when women were testifying as to the existence of an engagement on behalf of a couple whose parents sought to prevent a match, their declarations were attacked because no record was made of their having received formal permission from their husbands to testify. Formally requesting women to seek permission from their husbands before testifying and noting this permission on the record doubly reminded women of the inferiority of their oaths.62
The declining credibility of women's testimony about the existence of marriage promises paralleled the declining prestige of the old code of honor. The standard of honor required that women maintain their virginity prior to marrying, or at least prior to receiving a promise to marry from the man with whom they would have sex. When honor as virtue became a less compelling social requirement, women lost much of their direct access to sources of prestige. Although a woman's testimony that a marriage promise 59 For example, AGN Matrimonios, vol. 27, no. 110 (1770); vol. 13, no. 6 (1709) ; Archivo del Provisorato, caja 17, Reparas-Rio (1723); Matrimonios, vol. 85, fols. 190-203v (1743); vol. 25, Baptista-Mendoza (1760); vol. 110, no. 7(1761); vol. 15, no. 8(1765); vol. 73, no. 43(1773). 60 This is based on two studies: 270 contested marriages in the archdiocese of Mexico between 1690 and 1779 and a study of 400 applications for the Spanish and mixed-race parishes of Mexico City between 1752 and 1753. For data on the period 1574-1689, see n. 14 above.
61 AGN, Archivo del Provisorato, caja 18, Guerrero-Gonzalez. In another case, the advisor to the highest Mexican court denied the trustworthiness of witnesses presented for a case, saying, "Four witnesses have only rumor, [some] are underage, none are natives of the area, one is a woman" (AGN, Civil, vol. 2298, no. 7) .
62 AGN, Matrimonios, vol. 19, no. 105, fol. 368v, had been made lost credibility, her admission to having had sex (under promise of marriage) still disgraced her in colonial Mexican moral terms. Since she had no written promise to corroborate her testimony, the marriage promise was unlikely to be fulfilled, although she would probably receive financial compensation for the loss of her virginity. However, as this scenario became more frequent, a woman's declarations that she had engaged in premarital sex in response to a marriage promise began to be seen as a strategy to win monetary reward from the court, and the veracity of her testimony was questioned. This concern about women's economic motivation foreshadowed society's changing attitudes toward wealth and status.
Oral testimony and the economics of marriage Young men's increasing reluctance to carry out their marriage promis and the eventual acquiescence of institutions to this reluctance created vacuum of moral reasoning in which economic considerations-"interest in the language of the day-began to assume primary importance in shaping ideas about social prestige.6 In the years preceding the develop ment of capitalism in Western Europe-a period historian Pierre Vilar has labeled "adaptation to capitalism"-a new ideology of status began to supplant the old code of honor.64 Attitudes favorable to money-makin challenged older beliefs in the evils of usury, self-seeking, and the pursuit of gain. While the desire for money and power had always been presen with these new "adaptive" ideologies came an entirely novel respectability for such ambitions. As a result, worth came to be evaluated more openly i 63 Historians of Europe have argued that a similar phenomenon resulted when poverty stricken young men were unable to fulfill their marital promises. While this may have be important in western Europe, in colonial Mexico it was not the poor who increasingly soug to evade promises to marry but, rather, the sons of well-to-do provincial merchants, miner and landowners, a group whose general level of prosperity was rising throughout this perio While these men sometimes claimed that "poverty" prevented them from marrying, the were able to do so only because money had become a legitimate reason to avoid fulfilling a obligation of honor. Such an excuse was notoriously illegitimate (and indeed rarely use before 1700. It was thus not the objective economic standing of the parties that had change but the underlying attitudes toward money that had altered. For example, AGN, Matrim nios, vol. 34, no. 57 (1726); vol. 35, nos. 7, 8 (1736); vol. 15, no. 8 (1765) ; Seed (n. 18 above), chaps. 7-9. monetary or economic terms, and status ultimately tied to wealth gradually supplanted virtue as the prevailing standard of social prestige.6
By the mid-eighteenth century, in Mexico, the change was marked by a growing concern among wealthy families with maintaining (or obtaining) status and an increasing preoccupation with the economic consequences of matrimony for families. 66 The increasing reliance on wealth as the indicator of social prestige altered the cultural construction of gender. Since women did not acquire great wealth through their own actions but, rather, largely through inheritance from husbands or fathers, and since they no longer had access to an independent source of prestige-namely, their word of honor regarding the terms under which they had sex with a man-women were forced to attain status through the activities of their husbands and fathers. Dependent upon men to establish their economic standard, middle-and upperclass women became dependent upon male prestige to have their cases and their testimony heard and believed in court. Gradually these women were silenced, their voices heard primarily through the medium of male members of their families.
Historian Jean-Louis Flandrin attributed the disappearance of enforcement of promises to marry in seventeenth-century France to a relaxation of the canonical standards for breaking an engagement. Arguing that this signaled the beginning of an era in which people could win release from their promises to marry simply because they did not love the other person, Flandrin considered it a positive step in the developing acceptance of sentiment.67 The disadvantage, however, is that promises to marry could then be used cynically. Men could promise to marry to obtain sexual favors and then recant on the grounds that there was no emotional involvement, no love. For men who had sincerely promised to marry and then changed their minds, the change was no doubt a welcome relief from the massive hypocrisy forced upon them by the canonical requirements. The effect was not necessarily the same on women, for church officials in colonial Mexico had rarely forced women, even those who had lost their virginity, to accept men they did not wish to marry.6 The change in favor of sentiment meant greater freedom for the man to disregard his promises to marry but no corresponding loss of responsibility for the woman. Two people still consented to the sexual act, but after the decline in the enforcement of promises to marry only one bore the consequences-the woman. The era of the modem double standard was inaugurated.
The modern era ushered in conditions that made the Don Juan fantasy a reality. The ability of men to seduce women and avoid the consequences came about with the waning of a code of honor in which men's spoken word and women's sexual virtue were primary values. When words lost their power to create reasonable expectations for conduct, the woman's word regarding her sexual virtue waned as well, but sexual virtue was still expected of her, and she suffered serious consequences when it was questioned.
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Rice University 67 Jean-Louis Flandrin, Families in Former Times, trans. Richard Southern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 171-73. 68 The prelates of colonial New Spain were usually scrupulous in permitting women to forgo marriages they did not desire. Since marriages among Spaniards in Mexico were arranged by the parties themselves, to argue for release from a marriage promise on the grounds that one was not in love was easy for the facile and cynical. While that may reflect a growing evaluation of sentiment, such cynicism is not usually seen as advantageous for women.
